In the theory of cooperative transferable utilities games, (TU games), the Efficient Values, that is those which show how the win of the grand coalition is shared by the players, may not be a good solution to give a fair outcome to each player. In an earlier work of the author, the Inverse Problem has been stated and explicitely solved for the Shapley Value and for the Least Square Values. In the present paper, for a given vector, which is the Shapley Value of a game, but it is not coalitional rational, that is it does not belong to the Core of the game, we would like to find out a new game with the Shapley Value equal to the a priori given vector and for which this vector is also in the Core of the game. In other words, in the Inverse Set relative to the Shapley Value, we want to find out a new game, for which the Shapley Value is coalitional rational. The results show how such a game may be obtained, and some examples are illustrating the technique. Moreover, it is shown that beside the original game, there are always other games for which the given vector is not in the Core. The similar problem is solved for the Least Square Values.
Introduction
Consider the cooperative TU game:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
This is a constant sum game, hence the Core of the game is empty (see [1] ), so that there is no coalitional ra- (2) where N is the set of players, and , , . s S S N S = ⊆ ≠ ∅ We get ( )
and the efficiency is obvious, as the sum of components makes ( ) 1.
v N = However, every coalition with two players is getting in this allocation only 2 3 instead of 1, (the amount shown by the characteristic function of the game), so that each pair of players may wonder why would not leave the third player alone and divide this one unit among them. It follows that the grand coalition could be easily broken, it is unstable. Usually, one considers another efficient value, which may give a stable allocation, but we have seen that for the present game, with an empty Core, such an allocation does not exist. This is a good motivation for changing the game, while trying to keep the same solution. In terms of the present paper, we would like to discover a new game that belongs to the Inverse Set relative to that solution, but it is also coalitional rational.
The Inverse Set for the Shapley Value and the Core
In an earlier work of the author (see [3] ), the Inverse Problem for the Shapley Value, and even for the Weighted Shapley Value, have been introduced and solved. For the Shapley Value, this is the problem: whichever is an a
To sketch the solution, we introduce the following basis of the vector space of n − person TU games:
where
and
The vector space of TU games may be identified with 2 1 n R − , so that any TU game in the vector space may be written as an expansion 
(see [3] , Lemma 3.3). Taking into account this result, together with the linearity of the Shapley Value, the value of the above expansion (7) equals 
The Core of this family of games, when 3 L R ∈ is considered an unknown vector, is given by the system of inequalities 1 (13) as the set of TU games satisfying also the condition ( )
In our game (1) 
Now, we can verify that the Shapley Value is the same as before, i.e. we have ( )
the fact that this is in the Core. Of course, we may take, for example 1 3 N α = , and we obtain the same Shapley
Value for the associated game
and the Shapley Value is kept the same, and again it is coalitional rational. The discussion connected to the three person TU games suggests how can we behave in the case of games with any number of players, which will be considered in the next section.
A Family of Games with a Coalitional Rational Shapley Value
Consider now the general case of an n − person cooperative TU game. One of the main results of the paper is: 
where the minimum is taken over the index 
where the null values of the characteristic function have been omitted. Like in the three person case, if n L R ∈ is considered unknown and it is also assumed nonnegative, then the Core conditions are 
and for the parameter 7 12
we obtain the game
We may verify that the Shapley Value is the same, which now is efficient and coalitional rational. If we take, for example 2 3 N α = , then we obtain our game given in (22) and we know that the Shapley Value is not coalitional rational. Notice that (20) allows us to find the characteristic function of the coalitions with size 1 n − as soon as N a is chosen and we know L . 
A Family of Games with a Coaltional Rational Least Square Values
It is obvious that this is a family of efficient values, depending on the chosen function; he proved also that in this family is also included the Shapley Value, obtained for 
N w is a vector L, then the solution of the Inverse Problem relative to the LS-value is given by the formula
(see [4] , p. 71). If the LS-value equals L, then from the expansion (34), by taking into account (36) and (37), as well as the linearity of the LS-value, we obtain
Thus, like in Section 2, the expansion (34) 
If 0 L ≥ the LS-value of such games is in the Core, if and only if the above inequality (40) is satisfied. □ Notice that (40) is a formula similar to (19), which is obtained in the case of the Shapley Value. Also, in terms of the other weights appearing in the quadratic programming problem (27), we obtain from (31) the inequality
We proved a result similar to Theorem 1 given in the previous section. Example 3. Consider the same game as in the previous section, and let us take as weights in the quadratic programming problem the numbers ( ) 
After taking the value which satisfies the inequality with an equal sign, and computing the values of the characteristic function for coalitions of size 1, n − by using Formula (41), we obtain the game
We may easily check that the LS-value is in the Core of this game. Of course, we can take other values 37 48 N β < and get other games for which our LS-value is coalitional rational, so that we have a family of coalitional rational LS-values associated with our solution. Of course, we can also take other values 37 48 N β > , and get other games for which our LS-value is not coalitional rational.
Discussion
In the present paper, it has been shown how we can get, for an a priori given Nonnegative n − vector, a family of games ( ) , N v for which the Shapley Value, or the Least Square Value, equals this vector, and the value is also coalitional rational. It is noticed that, in both cases there are also families of games for which the Shapley Value, or the Least Square Value, are not coalitional rational. It is also noticed that the entire discussion was carried out for efficient values, by taking the most famous representative, the Shapley Value, and another family of values, the Least Square Values. Both are efficient values, while for inefficient values the situation is different because a definition of coalitional rationality is needed and therefore it will be considered in a further paper. Here above the coalitional rationality means the appurtenance to the Core; this explains the title and the content of this paper. Of course, there are many more efficient values where a similar discussion may be carried out. It is also noticed that Formulas (20) for the Shapley Value and Formulas (41) for the Least Square Values, which were helping us in the proofs of the two theorems, are tools in an easy computation of the desired game in the Inverse Set, as soon as the number N a and N b , have respectively been chosen.
